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SECURITIES REGULATIONS-PRIVATE OFFERING EXEMPTION:
SEC PROPOSED RULE 146.
The new, growing enterprise which seeks expansion capital in to-
day's market is likely to find the process of raising capital traumatic.
Prevailing high interest rates and stiff underwriting fees1 for more
risky enterprises may make the cost of capital prohibitive. Yet expan-
sion is often essential to survival, and the sale of securities is often es-
sential to expansion. Public registration of securities2 requires expen-
sive printing,3 certification by accountants, and sometimes costly revi-
sion of an accounting system to generate the information required by
detailed, often baffling, SEC requirements. 4 In addition, legal costs
may run as high as ten percent of the offering amount.5 It is particu-
larly unfortunate that at such a critical juncture in the life of an enter-
prise current federal securities law results in imposition of heavy ad-
ministrative costs associated with a public offering upon those very
companies which federal antitrust law seeks to nurture. Some enter-
prises cannot afford the delay required by SEC registration; 6 others
1. The underwriting cash discount or commission on a public securities offering
may vary within a range of seven to ten percent of the public offering price. Schneider &
Monko, Going Public-Practice, Procedure and Consequences,15 VILL. L. REv. 283.
298 (1970). A particularly risky offering may elicit an underwriter's fee of thirteen per-
cent or higher. Interview with Mr. Joel Starin, member. Washington Bar, and former
SEC attorney, Seattle, Wn., May 1, 1973.
2. 15 U.S.C. § 77e(b) (1970) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly-
(1) to make use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication
in interstate commerce or of the mails to offer to sell or offer to buy through the use
or medium of any prospectus or otherwise any security, unless a registration state-
ment has been filed as to such security ....
Section 5(c) of the Securities Act requires that a registration statement be in effect
with the Securities and Exchange Commission before a security may be offered or sold
to the public using any means of interstate commerce or the mails. This requirement is
intended to ensure that investors are protected against fraud and misrepresentation by
being informed of material facts concerning securities. S. REP. No. 47, 73d Cong.. Ist
Sess. 1 (1933).
3. Schneider & Monko, Going Public-Practice, Procedure and Consequences, 15
VILL. L. REV. 283, 299 (1970). Printing fees vary widely but generally range from
$15,000 to $20,000. If amendments and corrections to amendments are required or a
last-minute rush causes the printer to work overtime, costs may exceed $30,000.
4. Id. Accounting fees also can vary widely depending upon the type of business
involved, the sophistication of the accounting system, whether an audit previously has
been performed, and other factors.
5. Id. at 298 (based on an offering of $200,000).
6. SEC processing time for registrations between initial filing and effectiveness may
vary from two to six months. Telephone interview with Mr. Larry McKown, Office of
Company Filings and Records, Securities and Exchange Commission, Washington.
D.C., May 1, 1973.
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may wish to avoid public disclosure of financial data, the added time
and effort required of executives and/or the greater rigidity imposed
on financing agreements which SEC registration may require. 7 Hence,
in many instances the statutory exemptions from registration have
become crucial to the acquisition of capital for expanding enterprises. 8
The Securities Act of 1933 provides three important exemptions
from its registration requirements which may apply to new enterprises.
First, a small offering exemption is available.9 However, its utility is
limited in that only $500,000 can be raised over a two-year period.
Second, through the intrastate offering exemption, 10 the Act exempts
7. For example, a private placement financing arrangement may provide that incre-
ments may be borrowed as needed over an extended period. Similar public financing
requires that each increment be registered separately.
8. These exemptions do not shield an issuer from the significant. criminal and civil
law deterrents of sections Twelve, 15 U.S.C. § 77q (1970), and Seventeen, 15 U.S.C. §
771 (1970). See notes 70 and 71 infra. Moore v. Gorman, 75 F. Supp. 453, 456
(S.D.N.Y. 1948). The SEC is opposed to exemption from registration in situations
where the investor cannot "fend for himself" because it feels statutory registration and
SEC scrutiny have value to the investor above and beyond that afforded by the antifraud
provisions, as indicated by the remarks of G. Bradford Cook (former SEC Chairman)
which were delivered to the Conference on Securities and Current Corporate Prob-
lems, Big Mountain, Whitefish, Montana, January 10-13, 1973. Mr. Cook stated that
supervised disclosure provides more responsible and detailed disclosure, particularly
because of the twenty day waiting period which delays effectiveness of registration
statements and because of the preventive stop order available to the Commission. It
is questionable whether these considerations outweigh the small issuer's interest in
avoiding the extra expenses involved in registration. By using pro forma reports and
opening his books to investors, the issuer's legal, accounting and printing fees can be
minimized.
9. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b) (1970) provides:
The commission may from time to time by its rules and regulations . . . add any
class of securities to the securities exempted as provided by this section, if it finds
that the enforcement of this subchapter with respect to such securities is not neces-
sary in the public interest and for the protection of investors by reason of the small
amount involved or the limited character of the public offering; but no issue shall
be exempted ... where the aggregate amount at which such issue is offered to the
public exceeds $500,000.
Pursuant to this statute, the Commission has adopted Regulation A, 17 C.F.R. §
230.254 (1972), which exempts securities where:
(a) The aggregate offering price of all of the following securities of the issuer, its
predecessors and all of its affiliates ... shall not exceed $500,000.
10. 15 U.S.C. § 77c (11) (1970). This provision exempts:
Any security which is part of an issue offered and sold only to persons resident
within a single State or Territory, where the issuer of such securitiy is a person resi-
dent and doing business within, or, if a corporation, incorporated by and doing
business within, such State or Territory.
See generally Note, 40 U. CINN. L. REv. 779 (1971). For an argument that the intrastate
offering exemption offers potentially less risk of liability than does the private offering
exemption, see Mandel, Intrastate vs. Private Offering: The Advantages of Focusing on
An Often Blurred Distinction, 46 L.A. BAR BULL. 101 (1971).
The SEC has recently promulgated Proposed Rule 147 to remove existing uncertainty
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securities offered solely within one state to residents of that state. This
exemption provides a reasonable avenue for financing local enter-
prises with local sources of capital, but it does involve the risk that,
unknown to the issuer, some purchasers may be nonresidents or may
intend to resell to persons residing outside the state. 1 Either event will
cause a loss of the exemption. 12 The exemption currently providing
the most registration-exempt capital of any method of financing is the
private offering exemption, 13 which covers transactions deemed not to
involve a public offering.14 While it offers an avenue to large amounts
of capital, the exemption is fraught with problems. The applicable sta-
tutory language is vague, legislative history sparse, 15 and interpretive
concerning the intrastate offering exemption. SEC Proposed Rule No. 147, 38 Fed.
Reg. 2469 (1973). If adopted, the Rule would require that the transaction meet four
conditions to be deemed exempt from the registration requirements of the Act: (1) the
issuer must be residing and doing business within the State or Territory; (2) the offerees
and purchasers must be resident within such State or Territory; (3) reoffers and resales
must be limited to residents of that State or Territory for a period of twelve months
after the date of the last sale of any part of the issue; and (4) precautions, including leg-
ends on securities, must be taken against interstate distribution. The Proposed Rule
should bring greater certainty to this exemption, particularly by providing an objective
waiting period test for redistribution. However, its requirement that the issuer "reside"
within the State of the distribution will seriously restrict the scope of the exemption.
11. SEC Release No. 33-4434, 26 Fed. Reg. 11896(1961).
12. See, e.g., Armstrong, Jones & Co. v. SEC, 421 F.2d 359 (6th Cir. 1970); Hills-
borough Inv. Corp. v. SEC, 276 F.2d 665 (1st Cir. 1960).
13. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1970) states that the registration requirements of the Act
do not apply to "transactions not involving any public offering". See generally Israels,
Some Commercial Overtones of Private Placement, 45 VA. L. REV. 851 (1959); Com-
ment, 86 HARV. L. REV. 403 (1972) and Note, 24 U. FLA. L. REV. 458 (1971). Data re-
garding the actual dollar amount of securities are necessarily estimates because issuers'
reports on private placements are not filed with the SEC. Professor Goldberg has esti-
mated that private placement securities constitute over half of all securities sold in the
United States in recent years. 2 S. GOLDBERG, PRIVATE PLACEMENTS AND RESTRICTED
SECURITIES § 7 (1972). SEC estimates place the total dollars of capital raised by cor-
porate private offerings in 1971 at $7.7 billion, $7.4 of which was estimated to have
arisen from bond or debenture securities. SEC STATISTICAL BULLETIN 22-23 (February
1972). See also Comment, 86 HARV. L. REV. 403 n.3 (1972).
14. Although exempted as a private offering, an offering may run afoul of the resale
restrictions of the Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 77d(l) (1970), which provides a limitation on
private placements by "underwriters," defined as, inter alia, those who purchase from
an issuer with "a view to distribution" rather than to investment, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(l 1)(1970). SEC Rule 144, 37 Fed. Reg. 396 (1972), provides an objective test of investment
intent by requiring that a security coming within the private offering exemption be held
by the purchaser for not less than two years before release. See generally Symposium-
A Guide to SEC Rule 144, 67 Nw. U.L. REV. 1 (1972) and Note, 81 YALE L.J. 1574
(1972). A detailed discussion of the resale problems is beyond the scope of this note.
15. The legislative history of the exemption provides little help in analyzing the
provision. The basic policy of the Securities Act of 1933 was "that of informing the
investor of the facts concerning securities to be offered for sale in interstate commerce...",
S. REP. No. 47. 73d Cong., Ist Sess. 1 (1933). The House Report, H.R. REP. No. 85,
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cases overladen with open-ended tests and broad ambiguities. 16 This
situation has led to uncertainty as to the availability of the exemption
among issuers.' 7 The effects of this uncertainty may be far-reaching
since if a private offering exemption is relied upon but not established,
serious liability may result, including rescission of the offering, mal-
practice claims against the attorney and, in the event that a willful
violation is found, criminal prosecution.18 This note will examine the pre-
sent ambit of the private offering exemption, consider proposed
amendments to it and propose changes to clarify its application.
I. THE STATUTORY LANGUAGE
The statutory language does not define a private offering,19 but tra-
73d Cong., 1st Sess. 5, 15-16 (1933), stated that "The Act carefully exempts from its
application certain types of . . . securities transactions where there is no practical
need for its application or where the public benefits are too remote .... [It] exempts
transactions ... to permit an issuer to make a specific or isolated sale of its securities
to a specific person [but if the sale is] generally to the public, the transaction shall
come within the purview of the Act." The Conference Report, CONF. REP. No. 152,
73d Cong., 1st Sess. 25 (1933), added that "sales of stock to stockholders become
subject to the Act unless the stockholders are so small in number that the sale to
them does not constitute a public offering." See SEC v. Ralston Purina, 346 U.S.
119, 122 (1953); 1 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 653 (2d ed. 1961); and Comment,
86 HARV. L. REV. 403, 405 (1972).
16. See text accompanying notes 28-42 infra. The uncertainty of section 4(2) is
at least partially a reflection of the difficulty of construing broad, remedial legislation
such as the Securities Act. In interpreting the Act, the courts have sacrificed clarity for
flexibility in order to ensure the investing public a full measure of remedial protection.
gee Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332 (1967); SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau,
375 U.S. 180 (1965); SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953).
17. The SEC has indicated that the availability of the exemption is esentially a ques-
tion of fact and has cautioned issuers that an SEC no-action letter "may not be proof
against claims by purchasers of the security that registration should have been effected."
SEC Release No. 33-4552, 27 Fed. Reg 11316, 11317 (1962). Furthermore, the letter
may not be binding on the SEC. See K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT 118-20 (3d
ed. 1972).
18. The issuer may be found criminally liable for willful violations of the Act under
Section 24, 15 U.S.C. § 77x (1970). Criminal liability was imposed in United States v.
Custer Channel Wing Corp., 376 F.2d. 675 (4th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 850
(1967), rehearing denied, 389 U.S. 998 (1967). Even if willfulness is not established, fur-
ther violations may be enjoined under Section 20, 15 U.S.C. § 77t (1970), and pur-
chasers may obtain rescission or damages under Section 12, 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1970).
For a discussion of liability where the private offering fails, see Harrison, Thirty Eight
Years Without Definition-The Private Offering Exemption, 24 ARK. L. REV. 417, 434
(1971). For an argument that the general public may recover damages regardless of
privity where securities are offered without registration and in violation of the Act, see
Victor & Bedrick, Private Offering: Hazards for the Unwary, 45 VA. L. REV. 869,
875-81 (1959). These criminal and civil liabilities also may be imposed where private
offering purchasers act as conduits for distribution of securities to the general public.
19. See note 15 supra.
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ditionally has been thought to include offerings in which the investor's
need for protection by the Act's disclosure requirements is slight, such
as bank loans, placements with large institutions and promoter financ-
ing of business ventures. 20 Since the statutory materials provide only a
general sketch of the ambit of the exemption, one must consider inter-
pretations by the SEC and, of course, judicial decisions to find a thread
of predictability.
The first major administrative interpretation of the private offering
exemption was released by the SEC in 1935.21 While expressing the
opinion that the question essentially was a factual one, the Commis-
sion enumerated four factors considered important in granting an
exemption:2 2 (1) the number of offerees23 and their relationship to one
another and to the issuer; (2) the number of units offered; (3) the size
of the offering;2 4 and (4) the manner of the offering.
Eighteen years later, the United States Supreme Court in SEC v.
Ralston Purina Co. 25 established a broad private offering test without
directly relying on SEC releases. Ralston Purina involved an attempt
to distribute some five hundred shares of company stock to "key em-
ployees" under a stock option plan. The key employee recipients in-
cluded loading dock foremen and others who had virtually no knowl-
20. H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 5(1933).
21. Securities Act Release No. 33-285. I1 Fed. Reg 10952 (1935).
22. Id.
23. The number of offerees often has been an important consideration in ascer-
taining whether the exemption is available but seldom has been conclusive. 4 L. Loss,
SECURITIES REGULATION 2644 (Supp. 1969); Fooshee and McCabe, Private Placements-
Resale of Securities: The Crowell-Collier Case, 15 Bus. LAW. 72, 73 (1959). See, e.g.,
Knapp v. Kinsey, 249 F.2d 797 (6th Cir. 1957) cert. denied, 356 U.S. 935 (1958), (of-
fering to approximately 300 persons held private); SEC v. Sunbeam Gold Mines, 95
F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1938); Hirtenstein v. Tenney, 252 F. Supp. 827 (S.D. N.Y. 1966), (of-
fering to one person is not per se private); and Schimer v. Webster, 225 A.2d 880
(D.C. Cir. 1967) (offering to 100 persons held to be public). The current relevance of
numbers remains uncertain. See Katz v. Amos Treat & Co., 411 F.2d 1046 (2d Cir.
1969); Strahan v. Pedroni, 387 F.2d 730 (5th Cir. 1967); and Woodward v. Wright, 266
F.2d 108 (10thCir. 1959).
Note that the number which is relevant is not the number of actual purchasers, but the
number of persons to whom the security is offered. United States v. Hill, 298 F. Supp.
1221 (D. Conn. 1969); SEC v. Royal Hawaiian Management Corp., [1966-1967
Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 91,982 (C.D. Cal. 1967).
24. The size of the offering is perhaps the least important consideration today. 2 S.
GOLDBERG, PRIVATE PLACEMENTS AND RESTRICTED SECURITIES § 2.2 (1972); Value Line
Fund v. Marcus, [1964-1966 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 91,523 (S.D.
N.Y. 1965) (private placement of several million dollars held exempt).
25. 346 U.S. 119 (1953). Accord, Katz v. Amos Treat & Co., 411 F.2d 1046 (2d Cir.
1969); Lundquist v. Turner, 407 F.2d 857 (9th Cir. 1969), noted in 48 Nw. U.L. REV.
771 (1954) and 21 U. CHI. L. REV. 113 (1953).
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edge of the financial position of their employer. The Supreme Court
held that in order for the exemption to apply, the offeror must prove
that the offerees had knowledge of such investment information as
registration would disclose, or that they had access to such informa-
tion and did not need the protection of the Act because they could
fend for themselves. 26 Applying this test to the facts before it, the
Court found that certain offerees lacked both knowledge of, and ac-
cess to, relevant information about the issurer.27
Since Ralston Purina the trend has been to limit the availability of
the exemption. The broad knowledge-access-needs test was refined by
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Gilligan, Will & Co. v. SEC.28
That court suggested that the governing fact in proving an exemption
was whether the offerees were in such a "position" so as to either ac-
tually have had such information as registration would have disclosed
or have had access thereto.29 This ambiguous reference to "position"
has created uncertainty as to whether the exemption requires that the
offeree have a position of power, such as a high management position
or a major stockholding, sufficient to compel the disclosure of relevant
investment information or whether access to such information without
a position of power is sufficient.3 0 A narrow reading of Hill York
26. Ralston Purina, 346 U.S. at 125:
Since exempt transactions are those as to which "there is no practical need for [the
Act's] application," the applicability of [4(2)] should turn on whether the partic-
ular class of persons affected needs the protection of the Act. An offering to those
who are shown to be able to fend for themselves is a transaction "not involving any
public offering."
27. Id. at 126.
28. 267 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1959). (Although the primary issue here was whether
defendants should be deemed "underwriters," there was considerable general discussion
of private offering law.)
29. Id. at 466:
[The Supreme Court in Ralston Purina] held that the governing fact is whether
the persons to whom the offering is made are in such a position with respect to
the issuer that they actually have such information as a registration would have
disclosed, or have access to such information thereto.
30. 2 S. GOLDBERG, PRIVATE PLACEMENTS AND RESTRICTED SECURITIES § 2.4(b)
(1972). Uncertainty as to the relevance of "position" to "access" has its roots in SEC
Release No. 285, supra note 21, which stressed the importance of "special knowledge"
on the part of "high executive officers." See Orrick, Non-Public Offerings of Corporate
Securities-Limitations on the Exemption Under the Federal Securities Act, 21 U. PIrr.
L. REV. 1, 9-10 (1959).
In Gilligan "access" may be read as either dependent or not dependent upon position.
Thus, it is unclear whether an issuer can meet the access requirement by voluntarily
supplying the financial data which registration would require. For cases which discuss
the access requirement, see SEC v. Continental Tobacco, 463 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1972)
(court adopted the Hill York dicta which arguably requires special position); Hill York
927
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Corp. v. American International Enterprises,31 a recent Fifth Circuit
decision, suggests that some sort of position of power vis- -vis the is-
suer, and not access alone, may be required.32
Recent cases also have examined the sophistication of the investor
in determining the applicability of the exemption. The Tenth Circuit
stated in Lively v. Hirschfeld33 that the exemption would not extend
to persons who may have possessed some investment expertise where
they were not shown to possess exceptional business experience and
where they had no actual knowledge of or access to corporate records
which would allow that expertise to be exercised. In United States v.
Custer Channel Wing Corp.,34 the Fourth Circuit held that financial
sophistication is no substitute for access. On the other hand, in Value
Line Fund, Inc. v. Marcus,35 the district court for the Southern Dis-
trict of New York held, inter alia, that because the parties were so-
phisticated, knowledgeable investors they could "fend for themselves"
and therefore the exemption was available. The Fifth Circuit has
added further uncertainty to the sophistication standard by suggesting
that although an offering to a select group of high executive officers of
the issuer who knew each other and had thorough knowledge of the
offering is apt to support the exemption, it might not.36 There was no
Corp. v. American Int'l Franchises, 448 F.2d 680 (5th Cir. 1971) (the court intimated
that only where the offerees have a special position can the exemption be certain);
Lively v. Hirschfeld, 440 F.2d 631, 633 (10th Cir. 1971); United States v. Custer
Channel Wing Corp., 376 F.2d 675,678 (4th Cir. 1967) (the court emphasized access to
information without mentioning position); Value Line Fund Inc. v. Marcus [ 1964-1965
Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 91,523, 94,570 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (the court
warned that an insistence that all offerees in a private placement have positions af-
fording them access to corporate records might shut off the offering to all but key em-
ployees of the issuer).
31. 448 F.2d 680 (5th Cir. 1971).
32. The Hill York decision is particularly disturbing because of its suggestion that
only where the offerees are insiders is the offering likely to qualify under the exemption:
[W] here the number of offerees is so limited that they may constitute a class of
persons having such a privileged relationship with the issuer that their present
knowledge and facilities for acquiring information about the issuer would make
registration unnecessary for their protection, then the exemption is available.
448 F.2d 680, 688 n.6 (5th Cir. 1971). This dicta was adopted by the court in SEC v.
Continental Tobacco as the test of whether an exemption should be granted. For a dis-
cussion of the Continental Tobacco case, see text accompanying notes 37-42 infra.
33. 440F.2d 631 (10thCir. 1971), noted in 1971 DUKEL. J. 1071.
34. 376 F.2d 675, 678 (4th Cir. 1967).
35. [1964-1966 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 91.523, 94.956
(S.D.N.Y. 1965). Although the primary issue was whether defendants should be
deemed underwriters, the decision dealt extensively with the private offering exemp-
tion.
36. Hill York Corp. v. American Int'l Franchises, 448 F.2d 680 (5th Cir. 1971).
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indication which, if any, more diverse and less sophisticated classes of
investors might qualify.
The latest addition to the puzzling series of private offering cases,
SEC v. Continental Tobacco,37 led to some speculation that the ex-
emption was being restricted out of existence by the courts.38 Begin-
ning in May 1969, and continuing through October 1970, Conti-
nental Tobacco Company offered securities to at least thirty-eight per-
sons, including a dentist, housewives and businessmen who had no
relationship with Continental other than as shareholders subsequent to
purchase. One of the offerees, a dentist, testified that because of his
enthusiasm for the offering he left Continental's prospectus lying on
his desk for his patients to peruse. During this entire period no regis-
tration statement was in effect. As a defense to an SEC action to
enjoin the distribution of securities without registration, Continental
asserted the private offering exemption. Reversing the lower court
decision for the defendants, 39 the Fifth Circuit held that since no
special relationship assuring access to information was shown as to
all offerees, no exemption was established. Additionally, the court
held that since Continental could not prove the exact number of per-
sons to whom it made offers, and since it also failed to show that all
known offerees had actual access to information, it could not lawfully
rely on the exemption.40 While apparently adopting the most restric-
tive test to date, the decision is open to various interpretations.41 The
37. 463 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1972), noted in 50 TEXAS L. REV'. 1447 (1972), and 22
CATH. U. L. REv. 491 (1973).
38. BNA SEC. REG. L. REP. No. 144, The Disappearing Private Offering Exemp-
tion? B 1, B6 (March 22, 1972), infra note 41.
39. SEC v. Continental Tobacco, 326 F. Supp. 588 (S.D. Fla. 1971).
40. SEC v Continental Tobacco, 463 F.2d at 161 (5th Cir. 1972). The burden of
proving the availability of the exemption is placed upon the party seeking the benefit of
the exemption. See SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 126 (1953); Hill York
Corp. v. American Int'l Franchises, 448 F.2d 680 (5th Cir. 1971); Gilligan, Will &
Co. v. SEC, 267 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1959); SEC v. Sunbeam Gold Mines Corp., 95
F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1938). If this burden is not carried as to all offerees or purchasers,
the exemption will be lost. See Henderson v. Hayden, Stone, Inc., 461 F.2d 1069 (5th
Cir. 1972); Lively v. Hirschfeld, 440 F.2d 631 (10th Cir. 1971).
41. For example, the case may stand merely for the proposition that issuers must
present some minimum amount of proof as to the number of offerees as a precondition
to establishing the exemption. It also may be read as requiring access to information to
all offerees. Finally, it may embody a rule that an offeree must be "tantamount to an
'insider' vis-&-vis the issuer" as the SEC contended in its brief, BNA SEC. REG. L. REP.
No. 144 at B-5 (1972). Supportive of the latter interpretation is the court's adoption of
the dicta in Hill York as a test which arguably requires that a special relationship be
shown to come within the exemption. See Continental Tobacco, 463 F.2d at 159. For a
discussion of Hill York, see notes 31 and 32 and accompanying text supra.
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holding which requires identification of all offerees appears particu-
larly onerous because it establishes an insurmountable burden of
proof. It is unlikely that Continental could have proven to whom its
offerees, notably the enthusiastic dentist, showed the pro forma pros-
pectus. Yet all of those who read it might have been considered of-
ferees. As a result of this case, private offerors may be faced with the
very difficult challenge of controlling the use of their pro forma pros-
pectuses. Clearly some sort of limitation on this burden of proof re-
quirement is needed lest even more issurers be discouraged from pri-
vate financing of capital projects.42
As former Chairman Casey of the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion recently stated,43 "For forty years there has been great doubt as to
what constitutes the private offering exemption." Although recent
cases have purported to define and restrict the exemption, this basic
uncertainty remains. The access to information and ability to fend for
oneself tests of Ralston Purina44 have proved too vague to guide the
lower courts. Hence, the availability of the exemption has become es-
sentially a question of fact to be determined in each case. It is unclear
what role sophistication and investment experience is to play in the
decision; some courts have found sophistication irrelevant, while
others have held that a high degree of sophistication might substitute
for access.45 Some courts deem the number of offerees a major factor,
yet an offering to one person may be deemed a public offering.46 Most
courts require that an offeree have "access" to information, but there
is disagreement as to whether "access" requires more than the spoon
feeding of information to the offeree, i.e., whether "access" requires that
the offeree enjoy a position of power sufficient to force disclosure if
42. Under one possible solution, the unsolicited promotion of securities by pur-
chasers would not be considered actions on behalf of the issuer but rather as actions of
volunteers. If any civil liability to the issuer were to result, a complaining security-
holder would have to show a principal-agent relationship between issuer and soliciting
purchaser.
43. Remarks of former Chairman Casey, [Current] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 79,108
(1972). The commentators have critized the exemption relentlessly. See Harrison.
Thirty-Eight Years Without Definition-The Private Offering Exemption, 24 U.
ARK. L. REV. 417 (1971); Israels, Some Commercial Overtones of Private Placements,
45 VA. L. REV. 851 (1959); Victor and Bedrick, Private Offering: Hazards for the Un-
wary, 45 VA. L. REV. 869 (1959); Sargent, Private Offering Exemption, 21 Bus. LAW.
118 (1965); Steffen, Private Placements Should Be Registered, 43 N.C.L. REV. 548
(1965); Comment, 86 HARv. L. REV. 403 (1972).
44. See note 26 and accompanying text supra.
45. See notes 32 and 33 and accompanying text supra.
46. Hirtenstein v. Tenney, 252 F. Supp. 827 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
930
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necessary. 47 In addition, large and small issuers are uncertain whether
the exemption has been restricted out of existence by recent Fifth Cir-
cuit decisions in actions brought by the SEC.48
The tenuous status of the private offering exemption has had an
inhibiting influence on the free flow of capital to all businesses, but
particularly to smaller, less well established firms. So long as the
exemption is in doubt, investment bankers and institutions are justifi-
ably hesitant to raise funds for small, new firms whose risky offerings
are likely to receive harsh treatment in the courts. Current law does
not necessarily assure an exemption where only institutions or banks
are offerees. Further, the new issuer is hesitant to seek funds from
smaller investors because of these investors' reputed inability to fend
for themselves and because of the possibility that their individual acts
may destroy the private nature of the offering.49 The very real need
for clarity in defining the exemption has sparked two proposed
amendments which will be examined in the remainder of this note.
II. THE PROPOSED FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE
APPROACH
The first proposal, a statutory provision drafted by Professor Loss,
is contained in the first draft of his ALI Federal Securities Code.50 The
pertinent provisions of the Proposed Code would exempt an offering
from registration where fairly specific criteria are met. The offering
must qualify as a "limited offering," that is:51
(1) ... one in which... (A) the initial buyers are institutional inves-
tors and not more than thirty-five other persons . . . [and ] (C) the
original offeror and all sellers ... comply with any rule [adopted by
the SEC].
Additionally, "general advertising" by an offeror or reseller is made
unlawful.52
The Proposed Code responds to the proof problems caused by
47. See note 30 supra.
48. See notes 32, 37 and 41 and accompanying text supra.
49. See note 42 and accompanying text supra.
50. ALI FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1972) (hereinafter referred
to as Proposed Code).




the current law's emphasis on offerees53 by limiting its protection
to buyers only. As the comments to the Proposed Code indicate,
"it is difficult to see how an offeree who does not buy is hurt" by
the failure to register. 54 Thus the offeror's liability for unjustifi-
ably relying on the exemption would be limited to those actually
injured. The Proposed Code's prohibition of "general advertis-
ing" apparently reiterates current law which inquires into the
public or private appearance of the offering 55 in order to reduce
the likelihood that persons in need of the Act's protection will be
exposed to private offering opportunities. The Proposed Code
would leave the exact definition of "general advertising" to the
rule-making discretion of the SEC, and, because such advertising
is deemed a violation rather than an exemption prerequisite, the
possibility that a minor violation of this provision would give rise
to rescission or damages is avoided.
The limited offering provision of the Proposed Code requires
the participation of one or more institutional investors for the dis-
tribution to qualify for an exemption. 56 This provision presum-
ably adopts the rationale that since institutions characteristically
avoid high-risk investments, subordinating small investor choice
to institutional choice will substitute for the Securities Act. Thus,
the institution's presumably "safe" investment decision rather
than disclosure through registration would operate to safeguard the
investor. This protection provision contravenes an underlying
premise of the Securities Act-that protection of investors is to
be achieved by assuring adequate disclosure of material invest-
ment information rather than by statutorily dictating investment
decisions57-and could stultify private offering investments by tying
investor choice to institutional choice and seriously restrict the flow
of capital to new and high-risk enterprises.
53. Ralston Purina, 346 U.S. at 125.
54. Proposed Code § 227, comment (2)(b). The SEC's Proposed Rule 146 continues
to emphasize the issuer-offeree relationship.
55. See Chapman v. Dunn, 414 F.2d 153, 160-61 (6th Cir. 1969); Strahan v. Ped-
roni, 387 F.2d 730, 731-32 (5th Cir. 1967); Value Line Fund v. Marcus, [1964-1966
Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC L. REP. 91,523, 94,970-71 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
56. Proposed Code . 227(b)(1)(a) defines limited offerings as those made to "insti-
tutional investers and not more than thirty-five other persons." (emphasis added) Al-
though this requirement would constitute a major change in the law, the Code curiously
makes no mention of its rationale.
57. 1 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 184-86 (2d ed. 1961).
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Furthermore, the institutional investor requirement of the Pro-
posed Code in fact might not protect the small co-investor. The
Proposed Code would allow thirty-five unsophisticated small
investors to participate in a private offering regardless of disclo-
sure or ability to compel disclosure. It is foreseeable that institu-
tions will protect themselves contractually vis-h-vis the offeror
without regard to, and perhaps to the detriment of, the interests
of small investors.58 In addition, small investors might purchase a
private offering security in reliance on an issuer's prediction of
fast growth and quick return, misled by an institution which may
have determined that fast growth and quick return is unlikely but
which still purchased with a view toward long-term investment. It
is important also to recognize that the prohibition against "gen-
eral advertising" and the numerical investor limits contained in
the Proposed Code do not by themselves protect those thirty-five
noninstitutional investors who ultimately are persuaded to pur-
chase private offering securities. The "general advertising" provi-
sion will prevent the use of public channels of communication in
private offerings, but a large number of potential investors may
be reached through private channels. News of investment oppor-
tunities can travel long distances and reach many investors
through no advertising other than a few "hot tips." Furthermore,
issuers have an uncanny way of quickly contacting persons with
"loose" investment capital.
Aside from the unfortunate institutional investor requirement and
the resulting inadequate protection of investors, the Proposed Code
represents a healthy step forward in securities law. Its emphasis on
purchasers rather than offerees eliminates sticky proof problems 59
while its flat thirty-five person limit avoids current uncertainties as to
the numerical size of the offering60 and eliminates the vague "access"
test.61
58. The problem of inconsistent contractual protection easily could be solved by
requiring that such protection extend to all investors. Query, however, whether some
institutions would force small investors out of offerings rather than share their protec-
tions.
59. See note 40 and accompanying text supra.
60. See note 24 supra.
61. Ralston Purina, 346 U.S. at 125.
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III. SEC PROPOSED RULE 146
A second proposal for clarifying the exemption is the SEC's Pro-
posed Rule 146, issued November 28, 1972.62 Rule 146 is based
upon a determination by the SEC that the crucial elements in estab-
lishing the private offering exemption are access to information sim-
ilar to that which registration would disclose and an ability of
offerees to fend for themselves without the protections of registration.
The Rule would require that an offeror seeking its protection meet six
conditions. First, the securities must be offered and sold in a "negoti-
ated transaction" without the use of any form of "general advertising. ' 63
Second, before offering a security the issuer must have reasonable
grounds to believe (1) that the offeree has knowledge and business
experiences sufficient to allow him to evaluate investment risks and
make an informed decision, and (2) that the offeree is "able to bear
the economic risks of his investment."64 Third, during the course of
the transaction the offeree must have the "same kind" of information
which formal registration would disclose or have "access" to such in-
formation and "access" to any additional information needed to verify
its accuracy. 65 Fourth, the number of purchasers in any twelve-month
period may not exceed thirty-five persons, 66 exclusive of persons pur-
chasing for cash in excess of $250,000. Fifth, the issuer carefully must
limit redisposition of the securities through specified reasonable ac-
tions. 67 Sixth, the issuer is required to file reports of sales made under
this Rule. 68




66. Subsection (a)(l)(ii) of the Proposed Rule defines "person" as excluding "any cor-
poration, partnership, business association or other unincorporated entity organized for
the specific purpose of the acquisition of the securities offered in the transaction." How-
ever, "each beneficial owner of an equity interest in or equity securities of any such
person is deemed a separate person for purposes of this section." Application of this
Rule might exclude from private offerings an important source of capital for new
enterprises-investment partnerships in which one party has unlimited investment dis-
cretion. SEC Proposed Rule 146, 37 Fed. Reg. 26140 (1972).
67. Proposed Rule 146 at (g)(l), (2). The Proposed Rule requires, but is not limited
to, the following actions:
(1) Placing legend or other certificate on securities stating lack of registration and
restrictions on transferability,
(2) Issuing stop-transfer instructions to the issuer's transfer agent,
(3) Obtaining from purchaser a signed written agreement not to sell the securities
"without compliance with the act and rules and regulations thereunder."
68. Id. Within forty-five days after the end of any quarter of the issuer's fiscal year
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Because the Rule does not provide an exclusive definition of the
exemption,6 9 an issuer who cannot meet its conditions may still take his
chances on a favorable judicial construction. Although the Rule pro-
vides no shelter from the anti-fraud provisions of the Act70 or civil lia-
bility,7 ' satisfaction of its conditions would assure an issuer protec-
tion from SEC registration requirements, and registration-related
liability.7 2
The Proposed Rule must be applauded as a step in the direction of
clarity. Its standards are more objective than those presently existing
and should infuse more certainty into this area, thereby encouraging
the free flow of private capital. As the Commission states in its com-
ments to the Rule:73
... [t] he lack of objective standards in the private placement area may
be hindering the raising of capital by new businesses that are not suffi-
ciently seasoned to attract investment banking firms willing to under-
write public offerings of their securities.
However, should this Rule be adopted, many uncertainties would
remain within the Rule itself and in the penumbral area outside of its
protection still subject to judicial tests.
The first uncertainty involves the requirement of a negotiated trans-
action. The Commission's comments state that personal contact or
communication which provides an opportunity to ask questions of and
receive answers from the issuer or its representative must take place.74
during which sales of securities are effected in reliance on this rule, the issuer must file a
report of sales made under the Rule. Failure to report results in loss of the protection of
the Rule, which is an unduly harsh result. The Rule should be modified to provide for a
minor penalty, such as a $250 fine for each missed report.
69. SEC Notice of Proposed Rule 146, File No. S7-458, [Current] CCH FED. SEC L.
REP. 79,108 (1972): "The Proposed Rule does not establish exclusive standards for
complying with the Section 4(2) exemption .... "
70. 15 U.S.C. § 77a (1970); "It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or
sale of any securities by the use of . . . interstate commerce or by the use of the
mails. . (1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud.
71. 15 U.S.C. §771(1970) provides:
Any person who ... (a) offers or sells a security (whether or not exempted by
[Section 4(2)] . . . which includes an untrue statement of a material fact or
omits to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements ....
not misleading and who shall not sustain the burden of proof that he did not
know, and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have known, of such
untruth or omission, shall be liable to the [purchaser] ....
72. 15 U.S.C. § 77e(1970).




Just what an issuer must do to afford such an opportunity is problem-
atic. If offerees, known to be knowledgeable and able to fend for
themselves, are mailed offering circulars which include an invitation
to ask questions of the issuer, will this, without more, be considered a
true opportunity to ask questions and receive answers, or will it be
viewed merely as an empty gesture? It is foreseeable that a more overt
opportunity such as an actual meeting with time for questions and
answers, or actual evidence of bargaining such as communication of
registration-type information pursuant to request might be required. It
is doubtful that the negotiated transaction requirement adds to
the protection of investors afforded elsewhere in the Proposed Rule by
its "bear the risk"75 and "access" 76 requirements.
The requirement that the offeror have reasonable grounds to be-
lieve that a potential offeree or his representative is financially sophis-
ticated and that the offeree can "bear the risk" of the investment77
may greatly discourage reliance on the Rule. The "reasonableness" of
the offeror's grounds for believing that a person's business expertise
is adequate under the Rule necessarily will be evaluated after the of-
feror experiences a financial setback. The indices of financial sophis-
tication are sometimes quite subtle, and where an investment seems
especially desirable to the offeree, he probably will make every effort
to appear sophisticated if he knows his ability to invest hinges on such
an appearance. However, when his investment turns sour, the offeree
may be expected to reverse his earlier claim of sophistication and
complain to the Commission. Meeting this requirement potentially
could force the issuer to secure investor representation letters, to
perform background searches of prospective offerees and to secure
proof of each search, since the burden of proof undoubtedly would
continue to rest on the issuer.
Similar problems could arise in establishing reasonable grounds for
belief that an offeree can bear the risk of his investment. This require-
ment might discourage both those investors whose net assets, although
sufficient to undergo the risk safely, are much less than they would
like others to know, and those affluent investors who prefer to main-
tain financial privacy for other reasons. Additionally, it is not
75. See text accompanying note 64 supra.
76. See text accompanying note 65 supra.
77. See note 64 supra.
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self-evident what relation between investment and net assets a person
must have to be able to "bear" the risks of an investment. Does "bear"
mean to be able to maintain one's standard of living or does it mean
to be able to avoid personal bankruptcy if the investment were lost?
Assuming that bankruptcy did result from a loss of all or part of the
investment, would a presumption arise that the issuer did not make a
reasonable inquiry into the investor's financial position? As to many
offerees, issuers would be forced to undertake extremely thorough
inquiries in order to ensure compliance with this requirement. It also
is questionable whether a financially sophisticated investor with lim-
ited resources, such as a high executive officer of the issuer, should
not be able to decide for himself the advisability of incurring a risk.
Thus, the "bear the risk" requirement should not be adopted because it
precludes small investors who desire to invest in a private offering
where they are knowledgeable in a business sense and have sufficient
information to make an informed investment decision.
The access-to-information requirement of the Proposed Rule is
couched in the same vagaries which have so long characterized the
private offering exemption in the courts. It is unclear just how much
information or how much access will be necessary. The Proposed
Rule requires that the "same kind" of information be available as that
provided through registration. However, it does not appear to require
access to the exact information which registration W'ould disclose, pre-
sumably because information required in identical situations might
vary among SEC examiners. The Proposed Rule's use of the term "ac-
cess" without definition continues a current ambiguity. This "access"
provision of the Proposed Rule probably requires informal full disclo-
sure, that is, opening up one's books to full investor inspection. Until
"access" is defined, the Proposed Rule will remain seriously impre-
cise.
Another serious problem with the Rule is its apparent ratification
of the Continental Tobacco requirement of proof of the issuer's deal-
ings with all offerees.78 As mentioned above, this requirement poses
almost insurmountable problems of proof which would continue to
seriously restrict use of the exemption even if the Proposed Rule was
78. See text accompanying note'41 supra.
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adopted. A more realistic approach would remove entirely the em-
phasis on offerees. As Professor Loss has noted, it is difficult to see
how an offeree who does not purchase suffers injury.
IV. AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH
A clear private offering exemption rule is needed in order to enable
new enterprises to raise capital without resort to public registration.
As a guide for the SEC and the courts, such a rule should provide
predictability and reduce the risk of civil rescission for conscientious
issuers. Protection of investors must be the major concern of the
Commission, however, and cannot be sacrificed for the sake of clarity.
Proposed Rule 146 and the Proposed Federal Securities Code must be
rejected because neither ensures both clarity and protection of inves-
tors.
The Commission should reject Proposed Rule 146 because it lacks
the clarity essential to a workable rule. Proposed Rule 146 will not
resolve current serious ambiguities because it does not define "access,"
"sophistication" and "ability to bear a risk." The investment com-
munity will not rely on a rule which basically reiterates vague judicial
tests.
The Proposed Federal Securities Code is a model of clarity, but it
does not assure adequate protection of investors and therefore is not a
viable alternative to Proposed Rule 146. Its protections are inade-
quate because they would allow unsophisticated small investors to
participate blindly in private offerings provided that an institution-
whose interests are likely to be at odds with those of the small investor-
also participates. Furthermore, the Proposed Code makes no pro-
vision for assuring that the small investor will adequately understand
the nature of his investment risk.
Adequate protection of investors and clarity can be achieved
through the adoption of a rule which carefully includes in private of-
ferings those investors who can fend for themselves vis-a-vis the issuer
and excludes those who cannot. This writer recommends a private
offering rule which, while not excluding others who can meet relevant
judicial tests, clearly allows as investors within any twelve-month pe-
riod:
(1) Banks, Insurance Companies, Mutual Funds, Pension Funds and
other Investment Companies; provided that financial statements of
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the most recent year show such companies to have net assets in
excess of $500,000;
(2) Issuer's "insiders" defined as: (a) not more than twenty executives
who indicate in writing that they have a "working knowledge" of
the issuer's financial condition, that is, that because of their posi-
tion as employees they have day to day familiarity with material
financial information, (b) general partners and (c) owners of at
least twenty percent of a corporation's voting stock; and/or
(3) Investors other than those included under (1) above who purchase
securities for a price in excess of $250,000, provided the investor
and his attorney indicate in writing the investor's desire to forego
the protection of registration.
Provided that:
(1) After reasonable inquiry issuer and his agents are not aware of cir-
cumstances indicating that the purchasers are underwriters and that
appropriate steps are taken to assure that a deferred distribution is not
made, including: (a) placing a legend on the document evidencing the
security and indicating that the security is not registered and cannot be
transfered without registration or compliance with an available exemp-
tion; (b) issuing of stop transfer instructions to the transfer agent; and
(c) obtaining a written agreement from the purchaser that the securities
will not be resold without registration or compliance with the Act.
This proposed rule exempts from registration offerings to pur-
chasers who by virtue of their economic or managerial power can
fend for themselves vis-A-vis the issuer. There should be no doubt that
financial institutions can "fend for themselves," provided that they
have substantial financial resources. Therefore, this proposed rule as-
sumes that institutions with net assets above $500,000 have sufficient
investment expertise and financial bargaining power to force disclo-
sure and impose desired contractual protections. Also, the offeror may
determine whether a given institution is eligible by simply asking for
an audited financial statement. The inclusion of up to twenty of the
issuer's "insiders" enables small enterprises to raise capital internally
where feasible. This avoids the anomaly of forcing a company to pre-
pare financial reports to be sent to Washington, D.C., so that ade-
quate disclosure will be assured when it seems clear that SEC registra-
tion cannot add materially to what a company insider knows about
that firm. This rule contemplates that the term "executive" would ex-
clude persons not contributing services to the enterprise, thereby pre-
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cluding schemes in which securities are sold to otherwise unprotected
investors via a psuedo-executive facade. It does not attempt to decide
precisely what quantum of services would be required, leaving this
detail to subsidiary rule-making and adjudication. The requirement
that qualifying executive purchasers affirm in writing their working
knowledge of the issuer's financial position prevents such executives from
later successfully attacking the offering as nonprivate. Here the need
for protection is slight, and the need for clarity great. Lastly, the
"other investor" provision allows large individual investors to partici-
pate in the benefits of private offerings, but only after express waiver
of the protections of registration.
In sum, this proposed rule could achieve the clarity which is absent
in Proposed Rule 146 and the protection of small investors which is
absent in the Proposed Federal Securities Code.
S.M.L.
940
Vol. 48: 922, 1973
